Populism: the Muslim Connection

David D. Laitin
Stanford University
Keynote Address at the CESifo Conference “Globalization and Populism - Past and Present”
Populist Mobilization linked to cultural threat due to immigration

• Historical Association with Immigration
  • In recent years, over two million mostly Muslim refugees have arrived in Europe

• Dog that did not bark
  • In Japan, where economic doldrums were equally challenging, but no immigration, no populist challenge (Zakaria)

• Common Political Theme of Civilizationism (Brubaker)
  • Paradoxical combination of “identitarian” Christianity, secularism, philo-Semitism, and Islamophobia
    • All reflected in: Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, Denmark’s People’s Party, Norway’s Progress Party, Finland’s True Finns, Sweden’s Sweden Democrats, France’s National Front, and, to a certain extent, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, Austria’s Freedom Party, and Italy’s Northern League
  • Cultural threat rather than economics motivates the populist base
Despite secularism, Islamophobia is the deepest threat in Christian-heritage societies:
Empirical Support

• Deliberative democracy and citizenship in Switzerland
• Immigrants vs. Muslim Immigrants in French survey
• Attitudes of Europeans towards asylum seekers
• Identifying a “discriminatory equilibrium” blocking full Muslim integration into France
Can Religious-Based Integration Failure of Muslim Immigrants be Identified?

• Beset by “confounds”:
  – They came from secular authoritarian states in regions where democratic institutions are absent
  – They came in large numbers just before the collapse of the industrial labor market
  – Many came from colonies whose citizens were oppressed by the host country, leaving a legacy of hostility
  – In France, most came from Algeria, where colonialism yielded torture (by the French) and terror (by the Arabs) → conflictual historical memories
  – But several studies have made progress
Who gets a Swiss Passport (Hainmueller and Hangartner)
European Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers

• Conjoint experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in 15 European countries to evaluate 180,000 profiles of asylum seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes.

• Muslims are 11% less likely to be accepted compared to Christians

• See Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, *Science*, 2016
Trajectoires et Origines

- Goal: “to describe the diversity of the population” living in France between the ages of 18 and 60.
- Administered by INED, the State Statistical Bureau, in 2008
- 21,761 respondents
  - 8456 Immigrants
  - 8161 Children of immigrants
  - 3781 Native French
- Questions on personal history, living situation, values, and experiences
  - And for first time for official France: respondent religion
Immigrants are successfully integrating

The x-axis represents the coefficient in a regression that includes nationality of father, age, education, gender, and family situation. The outcome values are all standardized (mean 0 and standard deviation 1) and indicated by “std”, except for burial and gender separation (which are binary).
But *Muslim* integration slower and backsliding in relation with the state

The x-axis represents the coefficient in a regression that includes nationality of father, age, education, gender, and family situation. The outcome values are all standardized (mean 0 and standard deviation 1) and indicated by “std”, except for burial and gender separation (which are binary).
The sources of Muslim integration failure

• Based on experiments with native French with matched Senegalese Muslims and Christians --

• A “discriminatory equilibrium”
  • Native French have a distaste for interactions with Muslims
  • Muslim immigrants feel unwanted and separate themselves from native society
  • Native French take this separation as confirmation of their distaste
Key to an identification strategy

- In order to estimate the barriers to labor market success based on religion, we need to find an immigrant group that is alike in all respects to a Muslim group, but isn’t itself Muslim?
  - The Joola/Serer → France solution
  - Three groups for analysis: SM, SX, and FFF
- Plan of attack
  - Demonstrate discrimination
  - Analyze the mechanisms supporting it
  - Provide evidence that there is a “discriminatory equilibrium”
Establishing discrimination : a CV experiment

• Khadija Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard and Marie Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard
• Same CV: French citizens, two years of post-secondary education, unmarried, 3 years of experience on the job market
• Different signals
  ✓ Names: Khadija is Muslim, Marie is Catholic, Aurélie is secular
  ✓ Past position: Secours Islamique, Secours Catholique, secular firms
  ✓ Volunteer: Muslim scouts, Catholic scouts
Estimating the Implications of discrimination:
Large-n Survey of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation Joolas and Serers in France
The Search for Mechanisms

• The c.v. experiment taught us that there was discrimination, but not why.
• The survey taught us that the income effects of discrimination were likely to be substantial.
• Now we want to know the individual mechanisms that drive H.R. employees to say yes to “Maria” but no to “Khadija”.
• Is this discrimination “rational”, i.e. based on inferences about unobservables that are likely to influence job performance of applicants?
Research Interventions

Large-n Survey –
511 Serers and Joolas recruited through cell phones and face-to-face through chain referrals;
18-40 years old; born in France;
≥ one grandparent born outside of France who was a Joola- or Serer speaker;
339 SM’s; 127 SX’s

Experimental Games – conducted in 2009 and 2010 with subjects from the diverse 19th district of Paris – those in 2009 in eight sessions each with ten subjects from randomized FFF players and recruited SX and SM players. In 2010, some follow-up experiments.
- Speed chatting game
- Voting Game
- Trust Game
- Dictator and Strategic Dictator Games
- Name Game

Ethnographies –
40 families in France with Serer or Joola roots
Core Findings on Mechanisms

• 1. FFF, despite being radical secularists (laïcité), condition social behavior on religion
• 2. Rational Islamophobia: due to different values on gender and secularism
• 3. Non-rational Islamophobia: unprovoked deficit in altruism, and a threshold effect
• 4. An equilibrium sustains discrimination (by FFF) and alienation (by SM)
Mechanism 1
Religious Homophily in France

• Speed chatting, followed by voting game
• Voting to choose team leader, who would distribute 30 euros in any way to him/herself and all team members
• Players (largely driven by choices of FFF) conditioned vote on religious similarity
• In a voter/candidate pair, a 17% likelihood of a positive vote if different religion; a 30% likelihood if voter and candidate share a religion
• No other social predictor: gender, race, age, education, or income
Religious Homophily: Statistical Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post Speed-Chat Voting Game</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different Religion</td>
<td>-0.931** (0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Gender</td>
<td>0.328 (0.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Race</td>
<td>0.160 (0.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Age</td>
<td>0.002 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different level of education</td>
<td>0.0099 (0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different income level</td>
<td>0.004 (0.081)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit model; controls for female, age, education, income, race and religion dummies; unit of observation is voter/candidate pair; n=307; standard errors clustered at individual level; r-square=.064; ** denotes p<.01.
Core Findings on Mechanisms

• 1. FFF, despite being radical secularists, condition social behavior on religion
• 2. Rational Islamophobia: due to different values on gender and secularism
• 3. Non-rational Islamophobia: unprovoked deficit in altruism, and a threshold effect
• 4. An equilibrium sustains discrimination (by FFF) and alienation (by SM)
Mechanism 2: Rational Islamophobia

• Real differences in cultural norms
  – On religion and its place in public life
  – On gender roles and relations
Sources of Rational Islamophobia:

1. Religious Norms

Different religious norms freak out HR managers (Bouzar and Bouzar research)

- Ramadan fatigue and work efficiency
- Prayer obligations disrupt normal work hours
- Food restrictions prohibit commensality, and undermine *esprit de corps*
- Different views of *laïcité*
  - FFF see it as freedom to practice in the private sphere
  - Many Muslims in France see it as an excuse to forbid the public expression of religious membership
### Survey Data: SM vs. SX on French Secular Norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question (scale)</th>
<th>SX (a)</th>
<th>SM (b)</th>
<th>Raw difference</th>
<th>Regression-adjusted difference (b)-(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of God in respondent’s life (1-10)</td>
<td>7.592</td>
<td>9.006</td>
<td>1.414***</td>
<td>1.456***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether respondent disapproves of religious exogamy (1-3)</td>
<td>1.880</td>
<td>2.075</td>
<td>0.195***</td>
<td>0.174**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for people of same religion (1-10)</td>
<td>8.073</td>
<td>8.360</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is best friend of the same religion</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.086*</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether respondent belongs to a religious association (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does respondent have commonalities with people of the same religion (1-4)</td>
<td>2.912</td>
<td>3.190</td>
<td>0.278***</td>
<td>0.272**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources of Rational Islamophobia: 2. Gender Norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Values Survey on Gender Norms</th>
<th>Western Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supports Gender Equality</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approves Homosexuality</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approves Abortion</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approves Divorce</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Norris and Inglehart; scales normalized from 0-100; data from combined waves conducted 1995-2001.

Of course, these results are not identified, and it is a stretch to attribute them to religion...
Gender Norms from our Dictator Game

Rules: (1) Each player gets 5 euros for each receiver; (2) Players have never met any receiver and see their faces with ascribed name on a screen; (3) In different sessions, players will see same face with a different name; (4) Players can give \{0,1,2,3,4,5\} to each receiver, and keep the rest for themselves; i.e. they are “dictators”

Table on next slide reveals a gender bias, comparing donations to males/females for SM, SX, and FFF players...
By Gender: donations in dictator game

Male donations to coethnics
- Average amount in euro: SM 1.33, SX 3, FFF 1.57

Female donations to coethnics
- Average amount in euro: SM 0.33, SX 1.4, FFF 1.67

Male donations to rooted French recipients
- Average amount in euro: SM 0.58, SX 0.76, FFF 1.57

Female donations to rooted French recipients
- Average amount in euro: SM 1.39, SX 0.74, FFF 1.8
Core Findings on Mechanisms

• 1. FFF, despite being radical secularists, condition social behavior on religion

• 2. Rational Islamophobia: due to different values on gender and secularism

• 3. Non-rational Islamophobia: unprovoked deficit in altruism, and a threshold effect

• 4. An equilibrium sustains discrimination (by FFF) and alienation (by SM)
Mechanism 3:
Non-rational behaviors of FFF

- FFF withhold altruism (in trust game)
- FFF fear cultural threat (in dictator game)
Non-Rational Sources of Islamophobia

1. Pure Distaste

• Simultaneous Trust Game
  – Selected pairs of players; one designated as sender, the other receiver
  – Sender gets 3 euro allocation and can send \{0,1,2,3\} to receiver
  – Amount sent is tripled and put in receiver’s account
  – Receiver can return \{0, 1/3, 2/3, all\} to sender
  – Interpretation:
    • Amount sent by sender is based on “trust”
    • Amount returned to sender is “altruism” (a matter of taste)
Results of trust game: evidence of FFF distaste toward SM

• FFF show no difference in trust
  – Send 2.50 euros to SX and 2.48 euros to SM

• But FFF show significant difference as receivers
  – Send 48% to SX senders and 39% to SM senders

• (A complementary game showed FFF do not hold different beliefs about how much SM and SX would send to FFF).

• Trust game results show FFF are less altruistic toward SM’s compared to matched SX’s with no expectation that SM are treating FFF less well than SX’s.

• Not just xenophobia: results are stronger if we separate out SMM’s from SMA’s
First Names of SM and SX Players:  
The 2010 Name Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firstnames of SM players</th>
<th>Firstnames of SX players</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMADOU</td>
<td>CECILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIE</td>
<td>CHRISTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTOU</td>
<td>DANIEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWA</td>
<td>EPHIGENIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRE</td>
<td>GASTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATOUMATA</td>
<td>HELENE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBOU</td>
<td>LOUIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRAHIMA</td>
<td>MAMADOU JEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALS</td>
<td>NINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHADY</td>
<td>ROBERT ANTOINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAMADOU LAMINE</td>
<td>THERESE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUSTAPHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDEYE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSMANE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMSIR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YACINE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Non-Rational Sources of Islamophobia

2. A Threshold Effect

• Each of the 8 sessions had a different mix of SMs and SXs
• FFF subjects would therefore be exposed to different degrees of “salience” of religious difference for each session
• As more SM are in the session, FFF get less generous to SM; no such effect with increasing number of SX in the session
The Hortefeux Effect:
“One Muslim is Enough”

• “When there’s one [Muslim], that’s OK; it’s when there’s a lot of them that there are problems.” Brice Hortefeux, then serving as French Minister of Interior, September 2009
Comparing contributions to guises in the dictator game
Declining contributions to Muslim guises as SM numbers increase
A Matter of Distaste

• We believe (contra Becker/Stigler) that there is an accounting for (dis)taste
• A small cultural distance between a minority and majority → exaggerated fear that growing numbers of the minority would undermine majority culture
• Result is conspiracy theories that exacerbate fear
• Examples:
  – Anglican fears of “popish plot” in 17th c. England
  – Front National anti-Islamic fear tactics; Michel Houellebecq’s novel Sumission imagining Muslim Brotherhood winning the Presidency in France!
  – Popular press conflating Salafi jihadists with typical French Muslims
Core Findings on Mechanisms

• 1. FFF, despite being radical secularists, condition social behavior on religion

• 2. Rational Islamophobia: due to different values on gender and secularism

• 3. Non-rational Islamophobia: unprovoked deficit in altruism, and a threshold effect

• 4. An equilibrium sustains discrimination (by FFF) and alienation (by SM)
Mechanism 4: A Discriminatory Equilibrium

• Based on the survey and experimental results, the following tables reveal (compared to matched SX):
  – SM more distrusting of French institutions than SX
  – SM do not think French institutions or FFF treat all citizens equally
  – SM have greater attachment to home country
  – SM have less attachment to host country and its culture
# SM distrust French Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>SX</th>
<th>Significance (full model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Columns 1&2 are mean values; 1=Trust entirely; 4=Distrust entirely
Mechanism 4: A Discriminatory Equilibrium

Based on the survey results, the following tables reveal (compared to matched SX):

- SM more distrusting of French institutions than SX
- **SM do not think French institutions or FFF treat all citizens equally**
- SM have greater attachment to home country
- SM have less attachment to host country and its culture
## Unequal Treatment by French Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>SX</th>
<th>Significance (full model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration authorities</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pôle Emploi</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Mean values; 1=institution treats all equally; 4=institution does not treat all people equally
Equality not expected:
Evidence from Strategic Dictator

- With a “model” FFF chosen from the group, we ask players to guess (w/ a reward) how much the model gave to each player.
- With controls, SM expect about 1.06 fewer euros to the SM guise as compared to what an SX expects FFF to give to an SX guise.
Mechanism 4: A Discriminatory Equilibrium

• Based on the survey results, the following tables reveal (compared to matched SX):
  – SM more distrusting of French institutions than SX
  – SM do not think French institutions of FFF treat all citizens equally
  – **SM have greater attachment to home country**
  – SM have less attachment to host country and its culture
## SM More Attached to Home Country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (scale)</th>
<th>Regression-adjusted difference (significance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit: has respondent been to Africa? (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.105**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remit: whether respondent sends remittances to Africa (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy: degree respondent sympathizes with Senegalese living in Senegal (1-10)</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend: originate from Africa? (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.188***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association: is association you belong to related to Africa (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonalities: share with people from Senegal (1-4)</td>
<td>0.217**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burial: expect to be buried in Africa (Y/N)</td>
<td>0.386***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home: own home in Africa</td>
<td>0.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick Mother: disapprove of Senegalese student refusing to renounce French scholarship to care for sick mother in Senegal (1-3)</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A positive value in column 2 represents SM having closer attachment than SX.
Mechanism 4: A Discriminatory Equilibrium

Based on the survey results, the following tables reveal (compared to matched SX):

– SM more distrusting of French institutions than SX
– SM do not think French institutions or FFF treat all citizens equally
– SM have greater attachment to home country
– SM have less attachment to host country and its culture
## SM Less Attached to Host Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (scale)</th>
<th>Regression-adjusted difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy: toward French people (1-10)</td>
<td>-0.673***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict: immigrant should do everything possible to avoid conflict with host society (Y/N)</td>
<td>-0.135**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend: grandparents of best friend originate from France (Y/N)</td>
<td>-0.262***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right; whether political preferences can be positioned on a left/right scale (Y/N)</td>
<td>-0.176***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonalities: shared with French people (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.173*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burial: whether respondent wants to be buried in France (Y/N)</td>
<td>-0.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hide Father: approval of a man of Senegalese origin who hides from son's friends to help him pass as French (1-3)</td>
<td>-0.223***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A negative value in column 2 represents SM having less attachment than SX. *=p<.05; **=p<.01
Mechanism 4: A Discriminatory Equilibrium

Based on the survey results, the following tables reveal (compared to matched SX):

– SM more distrusting of French institutions than SX
– SM do not think French institutions treat all citizens equally
– SM have greater attachment to home country
– SM have less attachment to host country and its culture
– On most of these measures, third generation SM are more distant from SX than second generation, suggesting that the equilibrium is self-reinforcing (Greif)
Self-Reinforcing Alienation:
comparison SM and SX respondents whose families came to
France before and after 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (scale)</th>
<th>Difference-in-Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of god (1-10)</td>
<td>+0.753*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (when jobs are scarce) should have job preference (1-5)</td>
<td>+0.163**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastery of French (1-3)</td>
<td>+0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending remittances to Africa (Y/N)</td>
<td>+0.290**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owning a home in Africa (Y/N)</td>
<td>+0.166**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second column reports the diff-in-diff between SM immigrant whose first family migrant arrived before 1970 vs. after 1970, controlling for the immigrant’s age, gender and education. It then captures the evolution over time for SM vs. SX. A positive coefficient reflects the gap in the mean values between SM and SX (ref FFF) is increasing the longer the family has been in France. *=p<.05; **=p<.01
Conclusion

- There is a self-reinforcing **discriminatory equilibrium** in France in regard to its Muslim population:
  - FFF exhibit both rational as well as exaggerated non-rational behavior in interaction with SM
  - SM, perceiving more discrimination against them in France, separate more from the host society than do SX
  - Both SM and FFF act in ways that reinforce beliefs that separation of the two groups will persist
What is to be done? Three levels of intervention

Micro (level of the individual)

On Part of Muslims

• Private vs. Public Names for Muslims
  • Will FFF find other ways to interpret signals of Muslim-ness?

On Part of the FFF

• Broadcasting results of discriminatory behavior (the NBA referee evidence)
  • Are FFF, armed with norms of laïcité, committed to fair play as are NBA referees?
Meso (the level of intermediate organizations)

Private Sector Initiatives

- to identify and reward “diversity-compliant” firms
- to set clear rules for the limits of religious expression during work hours
  - necessity of treating women with respect
- to accommodate religious expression when not threatening to the *esprit de corps* of the firm
  - Halal foods in cafeteria

Educational Sector Initiatives

- Alter French “constant macabre” and its “triage machine”
- Involve parents (not just those of failing students)
Macro (the level of the state)

• Assimilation vs. Multiculturalism
  • Weak cross-country evidence that assimilation has better results for labor market integration
    • But real effects are on the specific policies

• Policy Initiatives
  • Citizenship Contracts
  • Refugee resettlement
    • Time to approval
    • IPL’s matching algorithm
  • Naturalization Rules (and fees)
  • Deportation and Children’s health and chronic absenteeism
Research Opportunities

• Apply modern experimental techniques working with NGOs, governments, and immigrant associations to learn what works to alleviate the “discriminatory equilibrium”

• To answer simple questions (that are hard to answer)
  • Why do HR employees say “yes” to Marie but “no” to Khadija?
  • Does “home sponsorship” have long-term positive returns for integration of refugees?
  • Are there interventions that lower native animosity to the welcoming of immigrants or refugees?

• To get “buy-in” for a quantitative measure of integration such that we can measure success across countries, communities and time
  • Introducing the IPL-12
Conclusion

• Liberal nationalism can stave off a populist revolt in France if the society can turn immigrants into Frenchmen without turning native French against immigrants.

• On this criterion, France does not suffer from a failure to incorporate immigrants. The problem for France (and for all European societies with Christian heritages) is the failure to incorporate Muslim immigrants.

• Survey data reveal that there is a divergence in values and societal success between Muslim immigrants and their Christian counterparts that does not decrease (and on some dimensions) it increases across generations due to a “discriminatory equilibrium”.

• If this trend persists, the cultural threat faced by the native population will grow, and this could sustain a populist agenda.

• It is therefore imperative in our research community, in collaboration with the policy community and affected populations, to learn what works to achieve better integration, with a focus on Muslims in Europe.